Skepticism and Practical Reasoning in Hume's Ethical Theory

Interpretations of Hume have tended to fall into two main categories: skepticism and anti-skepticism about the instrumental theory of practical reason. Those which fall into the former category regard Hume as a negative skeptic who denies any essential role for reason in justifying human conduct. Many Hume scholars have recently fought to exonerate him from the seemingly implausible implications of his skepticism about instrumental reason by demonstrating that the views which critics attribute to Hume are not really his; and that, on the contrary, Hume does not reject the theory of practical reasoning and the objectivity of values. My approach in this book avoids these two extremes by trying to reconstruct Hume's argument in such a way that his skepticism about practical reasoning and his ethical theory are not mutually exclusive. In opposition to defenders of Hume, the book contends that Hume's skeptical argument against practical reason fits perfectly into his overall polemic argument against ethical rationalists. Against critics of Hume, the book contends that Hume's commitment to skepticism about practical reasoning carries with it no commitment to skepticism about morality.