Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

This paper analyzes US policy on weapons of mass destruction proliferation, concentrating on the recent actions in pursuit of that policy. In 1998, it became apparent the U.S. non-proliferation strategy had broken down and possibly harmed its national security, namely in Chinese relations and over the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Also in 1998, the U.S. conducted two counter-proliferation attacks: the August cruise missile attacks against the Sudan and Afghanistan, and the December air strikes against Iraq. This paper's thesis is that realism, rather than its stated idealist policies, drives U.S. non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategy. It analyzes these four cases to determine whether the non-proliferation actions and its counter-proliferation attacks were consistent with its stated policy, and looks at other explanations for U.S. actions. It then discusses the implications of those actions, offering a solution for how to justify U.S. counter-proliferation actions in the future. This analysis sides with Bradd Hayes, who offered a suggestion for a "Doctrine of Constraint" that places U.S. counter-proliferation efforts on firmer legal ground. It recommends the U.S. push to change international law, offering an internationally recognized justification for its counter-proliferation policy.